American University Washington College of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Kenneth Anderson

January 1, 2005

'Global Civil Society': A Sceptical View
Kenneth Anderson
David Rieff

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/kenneth_anderson/111/

GCS2004 pages [ch01] 1-12

28/7/04

9:23 AM

Page 1.16

GCS2004 pages [ch01] 1-12

28/7/04

9:23 AM

Page 1.1

PART

1
CONCEPTS OF
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

Red lines will be extended in this image

GCS2004 pages [ch01] 1-12

28/7/04

9:23 AM

Page 1.2

CHAPTER 1

CHAPTER 1

‘GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY’: A SCEPTICAL VIEW
Kenneth Anderson and David Rieff

PART 1 : CHAPTER 1

Mohamed El-Sayed Said
Introduction

1.2

This chapter aims to raise scepticism about both the
conceptual and the practical foundations of ‘global civil
society’. We describe, and then challenge, a widely
received, standard account of what it means for
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
and international social movements to be described as
constituting ‘global civil society’. In particular, we are
dubious about the very application of the term ‘global
civil society’ to the international NGOs and new social
movements said to comprise it.
We are sceptical, first, of the claim that transnational
or international NGOs constitute ‘global civil society’,
at least if this term is intended to draw upon on the
conceptual machinery of ‘civil society’ as understood to
apply in a settled domestic democratic society. This
claim, in our view, is misplaced; indeed, we find the term
‘global civil society’ conceptually incoherent. Our
argument goes on to consider why, however, if our
scepticism is indeed justified, such inflated ideological
claims are made so as to convert international NGOs
conceptually into ‘global civil society’. We also consider
other, better, ways of viewing the rise of transnational
and international NGOs, including as a quasi-religious
movement and as a revival of the post-religious of the
earlier European and American missionary movements.
Alternatively, we suggest, the global civil society
movement might better be understood as imagining
itself as the bearer of universal values, both operating
in the teeth of globalisation and yet simultaneously
using globalisation as its vehicle for disseminating
universal values. It may be even better understood as a
movement seeking to universalise the ultimately
parochial model of European Union integration.
We are sceptical, second, about whether the values
that the global civil society movement embodies are,
indeed, as desirable as the movement’s supporters would
claim. Specifically, the fundamental moral values of the
global civil society movement appear to be about human

rights rather than democracy. Despite valiant theoretical
attempts by global civil society theorists to find ways
to satisfy the requirements of democracy while
recognising the limits of electoral participation in
something intended to encompass the whole world, we
argue that the ‘democracy deficit’ of the international
system is buttressed rather than challenged by the
global civil society movement, despite its commitment
to human rights. Indeed, we argue, the global civil
society movement seems to present human rights as a
set of transcendental values and as a substitute for
democracy, whereas, we would have thought, each
ought to be considered indispensable. But, if this is the
case, why is it so? We argue that it is best understood
as intertwined quests for legitimacy both by the NGOs
said to make up global civil society and by public
international organisations such as the UN. We suggest
that each legitimises the other in a system that is not
only undemocratic but also ultimately incapable of
becoming democratic. This, we argue, is what drives the
severe inflation of ideological rhetoric surrounding
claims about ‘global civil society’.
The final question addressed in this discussion is
deliberately speculative, and we do not pretend to
finality in our responses. Nonetheless, we pose the
question: what does the discourse of ‘global civil society’
mean post-September 11 and in the midst of conflicts
in Iraq and Afghanistan and the war on terror? We
tentatively suggest that, following September 11,
sovereignty and democratic sovereignty are back at the
centre stage of political discourse. This, we suggest, is
as true for states as it is for international organisations
such as the UN. One consequence is, perhaps, that since
September 11 attention has shifted away from ‘global
civil society’, considered as a marker of international
legitimacy, and back towards relations between
powerful states, the superpower, and the UN Security
Council Global civil society, both as a concept and as a
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practice, might be seen by future historians as essentially
a 1990s discourse which reached its apogee with the
1999 Seattle protests and the 2000 Millennium Summit
but which is frankly much less important in 2004 than
it was in 2000.

The standard account of global
civil society
The standard account of the meaning of ‘global civil
society’ (and this is deliberately the simple, unsophisticated analysis written for broad consumption which,
while running the risk of caricature, nonetheless
highlights some salient features) runs as follows.
Globalisation, it is said, is gradually eroding the
authority of sovereign states, which traditionally have
exercised control over actions, events, and persons
within their borders and, in the case of powerful states,
touching their vital interests abroad (Waters, 1995). The
processes of economic globalisation are instead transferring unprecedented power to a variety of transnational actors, including transnational business and
financial interests. Many of these transnational business
actors are familiar Western transnational corporations,
such as Shell Oil or Proctor & Gamble; others, however,
are much less ‘brand-visible’ to Western consumers and
include the movement of ethnically based diaspora
capital across borders, such as the circulation of ethnic
Chinese capital around the markets of the Pacific Rim
(Chua, 2003). These actors are able to take advantage
of the increasingly global nature of economic and many
other activities, whereas economic regulation remains
fundamentally national because the principle of
national sovereignty remains, well, sovereign.
In addition to transnational economic actors, a wide
variety of other actors also flourish in an environment
in which economic transactions, transportation and,
above all, communications are both transnational and
inexpensive (Rugman, 2001). These other actors include
NGOs of every variety and purpose, leveraging their
influence globally through global media and new
technologies such as the Internet (Gamble, King and Ku,
2000) The falling cost of worldwide communications,
however, has especially favoured the development of
transnational social movements. These include not just
international NGOs but transnational social movements
at a mass and not simply an organizational or
institutional level, including the growth of transnational
religious movements such as Islam, new social
movements such as Falun Gong, as well as a globalised

popular culture. Unsurprisingly, too, these actors also
include transnational organised crime, which takes
advantage of gaps between state jurisdictions to set up
transnational operations in drug trafficking, weapons
smuggling, illegal immigration, trafficking in persons,
prostitution and the exploitation of child sex workers,
and other illegal activities. Finally, of course, there are
transnational terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda,
which rely on a web of globalised economic transactions
to finance themselves (including cross-border crime such
as drug trafficking), international social movements that
provide a base of social support that transcends borders,
and cross-border acts of terrorism; transnational
terrorism acts, in effect, as a kind of perverse NGO.
One important source of the presumed erosion of
sovereignty is the loss of regulatory control over crossborder actions, which produces situations for which
regulation is urgently needed, such as cross-border
protection of the natural environment (pollution knows
no borders). Still, the erosion of sovereignty generally is
understood, on the standard account, to be a good and
worthy thing (Held et al., 1999). Sovereignty is at best
an impediment to the universal good governance of
human beings, whose fundamental rights and needs
know no borders, and to the ideal of political progress
which, in a long intellectual tradition, has been
understood to lead to universal political governance for
the protection of universal human rights and the
provision for universal human needs. At worst,
sovereignty has served, on the standard account, to
protect regimes that oppress their own people and,
perhaps worst of all, that wage war (the right to wage
war, after all, was long seen as the defining attribute of
sovereignty). A globalising world stands in need of a
globalising political authority to regulate it, according
to the standard account, less because of the failures of
sovereign states adequately to regulate the transactions
of the global world than because of the moral
deficiencies of the very idea of sovereignty (Beck, 2003).
What is needed instead, therefore, is global
governance, ideally exercised by a reformed and
transformed United Nations, in order to protect the poor
and global labour, promote the global distribution of
wealth and the equity of trade, and safeguard the
environment, health, human rights, gender equity and
many other things. The just claims of global governance
are impeded, however, by the residue of sovereignty, and
above all by the sovereignty of the world’s superpower,
the United States, which sees much to lose and little to
gain from global governance because of the authority
it would have to yield to others over how it uses its

‘GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY’: A SCEPTICAL VIEW

GCS2004 pages [ch01] 1-12

1.3

28/7/04

9:23 AM

Page 1.4

FREDERIK NAUMANN/PANOS PICTURES

GCS2004 pages [ch01] 1-12

PART 1 : CHAPTER 1

Are faith groups part of ‘global civil society?’

1.4

power. (Although all states would have to cede
authority, the more powerful the state, the more power
is ceded; and the United States, the most powerful state
of all, would have to cede the most power.) This is indeed
vexing, on the standard account. And yet the growth of
transnational global governance is understood as
historically inevitable. It is as natural a process as the
consolidation that the United States experienced in the
nineteenth century, or the consolidation that the
European Union is heroically undergoing today (Giddens,
2000). It cannot help but occur – eventually – for it is
not merely a matter of ideology but is materially driven
by essentially the same forces that today benefit from
an economy which is global in effect but nationally
controlled – technology, communications, and
transportation especially – but which tomorrow benefit
from markets that are both globally open and globally
regulated rather than regulated piecemeal by conflicting
and counter-efficient national regulators. Be of good
cheer – for, on the standard account, the material
conditions of history drive forward both the erosion of
sovereignty and the final triumph of global governance.

We are, however, at a dangerous historical moment:
transnational economic forces are taking advantage of
the current vacuum in which national sovereignty is
being eroded but is not definitively being replaced by
global governance. Much of the burden of sustaining
the dream has fallen, ideologically at least, not just upon
the existing organs of international governance such as
the UN (which is understood even by its friends to be,
however noble in original intent, inefficient and weak
at best, and venal and lacking in legitimacy at worst),
but also upon transnational NGOs (Kaldor, Anheier and
Glasius, 2003) This may appear, on the standard account,
initially somewhat surprising; who are these selfappointed NGOs to be the bearers of anything besides
their own interests and values? Yet international NGOs
have gradually taken a leading role in providing what is
declared to be the legitimate, and politically legitimising,
input of the world’s people across a myriad of issues and
causes (Tyler, 2003). International NGOs come together
to advocate for the peoples of the world, those who
would otherwise have no voice, given that the actors
they seek to influence, which include both economic
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actors and the world’s superpower, are globally
unregulated.
It is conceptually appropriate, on the standard
account, to describe this conglomeration of transnational NGOs and associated social movements as
‘global civil society’ (or ‘international civil society’ or
‘transnational civil society’) because they are civil society
organisations that operate on a transnational or
international rather than a domestic scale (Keane, 2003).
Yet their advocacy function is really analogous, on a
global scale, to that of their domestic society
homologues. And given that the international arena is
far from democratic, their advocacy is all the more
necessary because international civil society provides
the only voice the ‘peoples’ of the world have to
intermediate on their behalf with transnational actors
or international institutions (The Economist, 1999)
Nonetheless, it is essential to be clear, even in the
midst of delivering this standard account, that those
who speak with enthusiasm about global civil society in
fact have a specifically value-laden view of it. It is, in a
word, institutionalised ‘new social movements’ –
promoting environmentalism, feminism, human rights,
economic regulation, sustainable development, and so
on – that count (Carothers, 1999). Yet the Roman
Catholic Church and many far more politically conservative Christian denominations, for example, are in
fact transnational NGOs of great size, resources,
members, and energy. But for their politics, they surely
would be included as part of ‘global civil society’ on any
politically neutral interpretation of that term. But ‘global
civil society’ is understood by its advocates to be a
‘progressive’ movement, and thus it contains only certain
– politically progressive – NGOs and social movements
(Rieff, 1998).
With that caveat to the standard account, therefore,
global civil society is thus perceived as the logical
continuation of the growth of civil society (or at least
of ‘progressive’ civil society), elevated from the level of
merely domestic democratic society. Global civil society
is the advocate and intermediary for the people of the
world both in the nascent institutions of global
governance as well as against those transnational actors
– transnational economic actors and the United States,
principally – that impede the emergence of global
governance that reflects ‘progressive’ values. Without
global civil society, the people of the world have no
voice and no representation to advocate for ‘correct’
values before the world’s transnational institutions.
These transnational NGOs are properly called ‘global civil
society’ and not merely ‘advocacy NGOs’ for the

fundamental reason that they are perceived, on the
standard account, to speak for the people of the world
(Williams, 1997).

Why ‘global civic society’ is a
misnomer
The claim to be ‘global civil society’ is at its heart a claim
to be something more than merely a collection of
advocacy NGOs and social movements with visions and
axes to grind on any number of particular topics. Global
civil society is claimed to be the international,
transnational analogue of that which is called ‘civil
society’ in a settled domestic democratic society. This
claim rests, however, on two alleged analogies: between
‘civil society’ and ‘global civil society’ and between a
settled domestic democratic society (in which civil
society is a part of the fabric of domestic society) and
an ‘international society’ or, of one likes, ‘international
community’. These analogies seem to us flawed, in
closely related ways.
The analogy between civil society and global civil
society rests on the assumption that the NGOs bearing
these conceptual labels can and do play similar roles in
very different settings. Civil society institutions that are
part of the social fabric of a settled domestic democratic
society are able to play the role of single-minded
advocates – organisations with an axe to grind and a
social mission to accomplish – precisely because they
are not, and are not seen as being, ‘representative’ in
the sense of democratic representation (Anderson,
2000). They do not stand for office. Citizens do not vote
for this or that civil society organisation as their
representatives because, in the end, NGOs exist to reflect
their own principles, not to represent a constituency to
whose interests and desires they must respond. NGOs in
their most exalted form (and there are many hybrid
exceptions) exist to convince people of the rightness of
their ideals and invite people to become constituents of
those ideals, not to advocate for whatever ideals people
already happen to have. Thus, voters may listen to what
NGOs tell them as lobbyists and advocates but, in the
end, NGOs are separate from the ballot box.
True, voters do vote for political parties, which are in
some sense civil society organisations. Yet political
parties, like labour unions, while non-governmental in
certain ways, are historically separate from the NGOs
that serve as the touchstones of the global civil society
analogy – the crusading or do-gooding organisations
that see themselves as bearers of values far more
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universal than the agglomerated interest groups that
are political parties. Certainly those who draw an
analogy between global civil society and domestic civil
society are thinking, not of political parties, but rather
of such examples as the American Civil Liberties Union
in the United States, or the Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo of
Guatemala (supporting families of the disappeared), or
the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (providing microcredit and organising development projects among the
poor) (Otto, 1996). This partly reflects the view, often
justified, among civil society advocates that political
parties, when not merely venal, and despite their
rhetoric to the contrary at party congresses and
conventions, are bearers of interests, not of the universal
values disinterestedly held on which civil society
organisations pride themselves: global civil society
advocates would not necessarily want to assimilate
themselves by analogy to political parties. At the same
time, it has also been observed that in democratic
transitions there is an indispensable point when talented
and virtuous people, committed to the democratic
process, must invigorate the political party process
precisely because, responding to multiple interests of
multiple groups, it serves a vital social and political
integrating function in a way that civil society
organisations, remaining isolated in their purity of
principle, cannot do (Carothers, 1999). Civil society
organisations are therefore the glory of democratic
societies, but they are not the electoral institutions of
democracy. And because they are not electoral
institutions – not representative in the electoral sense
– they are free to be pure, unabashed advocates of a
point of view, free to ignore all the contradictory
impulses that democratic politics requires and the
compromises and adjustments and departures from
principled purity that democratic politicians must make,
and free to ignore entirely what everyone else, the great
democratic masses and their leaders, might think in
favour of what they themselves believe is the right, the
true, and the good (Anderson, 2001).
International NGOs may believe that they play this
same role in the international realm but, in so far as they
aspire to the legitimacy of ‘global civil society’, they
cannot and do not. The reason is beyond their control:
the system in which they purport to advocate is not
democratic. And because it is not, their advocacy role
cannot be and is not the same; the analogy fails. The
difference lies in the claim of ‘representativeness’
(Annan, 1999a). In a settled domestic democratic society,
civil society advocacy claims to represent no one other
than itself, and stakes its legitimacy, first, on the right

and value of free expression and, second, on the ability
to persuade others to adopt its views. In some cases it
might organise itself as a voting bloc, an electoral
interest group, but it is striking that within democratic
societies the most effective civil society advocacy
organisations have no electoral constituencies of their
own, but rely on their rational persuasiveness; if they
have a constituency, it is the media. International civil
society, when it sees itself as global civil society, aspires
to a quite different, and much more inflated, set of roles:
first, to ‘representativeness’, and second, to ‘intermediation’ – to stand between the people of the world
and various transnational institutions (Annan, 2000).
Civil society organisations in domestic democratic
societies do not claim either to represent or to
intermediate; they do not stand between the people and
their elected representatives, because the ballot box
does.
Obviously this scepticism about the analogy between
civil society in a domestic democratic society and global
civil society in an undemocratic global system is closely
related to the second grounds for scepticism, about the
analogy between a settled domestic democratic society
and what is inappositely (begging the question, as it
were) called ‘international society’ or the ‘international
community’ (Rieff, 1999). Because, plainly, international
society is not democratic, international NGOs are
deprived of the democratic context in which their
(disanalogous) domestic counterparts act. That
democratic context, peculiarly, allows domestic civil
society organisations to be what we understand as ‘civil
society’ by relieving them of the possibility, the
obligation, and indeed the temptation to regard
themselves as representatives or intermediaries.
Scepticism about the claims of ‘global civil society’,
therefore, rests on scepticism about its analogy with
domestic civil society and about the analogy between
domestic democratic society and international society.
In each case, the touchstone is the problem of
democracy. The claim of global civil society is that it
plays the same role as domestic civil society but, because
the environment in which it acts is not democratic, it
aspires, perversely, to roles that domestic civil society
does not claim, namely, representation and
intermediation. The claim of global civil society elevates
the status and reach and importance of what are
otherwise merely international NGOs advocating and
acting for what they see as the right and the good. It
elevates them, however, supposedly to the equivalent
level of civil society but by claiming precisely what civil
society eschews, because it operates in a democratic
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Social conference of NGOs Denmark
environment. But the key in these ironies is always the
democratic deficit of the international system, and the
question whether it can be made up.
Before turning to those issues, however, we should
acknowledge the two principal objections to this
scepticism about the claims of global civil society. The
first objection (which will be taken up later as one of
the normative concerns about democracy) is that this
account makes too much of democracy and electoral
democracy in particular (Held et al., 1999) Domestic
democratic systems, it might be said, are not so
democratic as all that, and the ballot box is overrated
and fetishised in what is really better understood as an
agglomeration of interest groups in which NGOs indeed
serve as representatives and intermediaries. Democracy
is not all that it is made out to be, and our scepticism
sets too high a bar by invoking it.
The second objection is a practical one. Even if this
scepticism, this lack of anology, should be acknowledged
in some way as true, then is that really a reason for
NGOs to pack up their tents, so to speak, and go home?
Isn’t the proper response to press on for the sake of both
their causes and the democratisation of the
international system, so that the scepticism is defanged
by making the system democratic and the NGOs
genuinely a global civil society? The short answer is that
our scepticism is a basis for giving up the ideological

pretensions of global civil society in order to focus on
accomplishing specific social missions, but this objection
will likewise be taken up at greater length below under
the normative discussion of democracy.

Other ways of understanding
international NGOs
It is worth noting that international NGOs can be
understood as a social movement on very different
models from that of global civil society. One or another
of these might be thought frankly more powerful in
explaining the international NGO movement. One model
is simply that of a contemporary secular, post-religious
missionary movement (Anderson, 1998).
On this view, the NGO movement, rather than being
global civil society in the contradictory sense discussed
earlier, is simply the analogue of the Western missionary
movements of the past, which carried the gospel to the
rest of the world and sought in this way to promote
truth, salvation, and goodness. It is a weak sense of
religious movement because it claims a connection to
earlier religious missionary movements only by analogy
rather than through a genuinely historical inheritance.
Yet even by analogy alone it remains a powerful way of
explaining the international NGO movement. It is a
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movement with transcendental goals and beliefs. It is
self-sacrificing and altruistic. It asserts a form of
universalism and builds it into its transcendentalism. It
appeals to universal, transcendental, but ultimately
mystical values – the values of the human rights
movement and the ‘innate’ dignity of the person –
rather than to the values of democracy and the multiple
conceptions of the good that, as a value, it spawns. Most
notably, its personnel do indeed resemble missionary
orders – the human rights organisations, for example,
might be thought of as the Jesuits of the movement, or
perhaps Opus Dei, keepers of the true doctrines, the true
universals, while the development organisations might
be thought of as the equivalent of the Maryknoll Order,
one of the Catholic missionary orders devoted to human
development among the world’s poor. (If this be thought
offensive as a caricature, no offence is intended, as it
proposed as an aid to thinking beyond the categories of
liberalism writ into liberal internationalism; if, on the
other hand, this characterisation is thought offensive
because sacrilegious to the NGO movement – what,
nineteenth-century foreign missionaries in modern
dress? – well, that is just the point.)
Why does this matter? Because, in so far as the NGO
movement, especially in aspiring to the status of global
civil society, actually elevates itself into a religious
movement, it underscores that the universal claims it
makes are so only in the sense that each religion makes
its own universal claims. That is, each religion makes a
claim of universality, but – seen severally from the
outside – each is just one among many such religions.
Seen as a religion, seen as missionary work, global civil
society’s (fundamentally human rights) claims are just
one set of universal claims amid all the others that
religions and transcendental philosophies make. There
is no obvious sense in which any one of them has special
authority. This, obviously, threatens the moral hegemony
that the NGO movement claims through its morality of
human rights, and so has been a reason for resisting the
analogy to religious missionary movements and for
preferring the much more accommodating ideology of
global civil society.
A second way of seeing the international NGO
movement and its claims about the need for global
governance – the presumed obviousness of the good of
overcoming sovereignty – is that it universalises and
claims as the path of history the ideal of creating larger
and larger political entities. The narrow motivation for
doing so is perfecting the regulation of transnational
actors. The broad motivation is that it is thought to be
the historically progressive thing to do. But it might be

thought that this universalising of size and number in
fact represents the fetishising of a parochial model –
that of the European Union (Giddens, 2000). One may
admire the accomplishments of the European Union
without believing that it represents a universal model
for humankind at the planetary level. One may
understand European grandees whose experience has
taught them that integration works – works in Europe
and can create peace, prosperity, and respect for human
rights – without actually believing the corollary, not just
that it can work elsewhere, but that it can work on a
planetary level (Carothers, 1999). Why does this matter?
Because it raises the possibility that what has been urged
with such grandiosity as the universal condition of
liberal internationalism is, instead, simply the unjustified
universalising of a particular historical and cultural
experience, EU integration – a project, moreover, whose
ultimate outcome is far from clear.
What is common among these alternative views is

Please provide text extract of a suitable
length for this box. Please provide text
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length for this box.

that they challenge a key moral assumption built into
the ideology of global civil society: the universality and
transcendence and completeness of its moral system,
which is that of universal human rights. They question
whether leaving democracy out of account can give a
complete moral system in the way that the ideology of
human rights claims to – while not coincidentally
leaving the interpretation and authority of that ideology
in the hands of global civil society itself. In invoking
either religious models or EU parochialism, alternative
explanations of the international NGO movement
challenge the movement’s universal claims. Thus, by
extension, they challenge a key reason for which the
claim to be ‘global civil society’ was invoked in the first
place, namely, its claim to be universal, representative,
and an intermediary for the peoples of the world. Each
alternative explanation in its own way threatens the
authority that the international NGO movement claimed
for itself when it appropriated the elevated, ideologically
extravagant language of global civil society.
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The value of democracy
A further ground for scepticism about global civil society
is that the universalist values that it espouses may not
be so good, or at least so complete, as it implies. The key
issue, once again, is the question of democracy or, more
precisely, democratic legitimacy and the lack thereof –
the much discussed ‘democratic deficit’ (Diamond,
2003). Against our moral complaint that the international system lacks democratic legitimacy, and that
this is a major problem for advocates of global civil
society who are inclined to substitute human rights for
democracy, there are perhaps five principal responses.
We will set them out and offer a reply to each of them.
First, it can simply be said that global democratic
legitimacy is not as necessary, or at least not as important,
as our moral claim makes it out to be. It can be said, for
example, that the claim that the international system
lacks democratic legitimacy ignores the fact that most
so-called national democracies are not really democratic,
but are really just collections of colliding interest groups,
in which the ballot box plays a relatively small role in how
political decisions are reached. Our account fetishises the
ballot over actual political relations in democratic states.
We have, it can be said, raised the bar for the democratic
legitimacy of the international system far higher than it
is in so-called democracies. Democratic legitimacy is
mostly an illusion in democratic states, not the fact of
the matter; what matters is instead the perception of their
legitimacy. And that perception is less a function of actual
democratic process than the fulfilment, through efficient
government, bureaucracies, and economies, of the
material expectations of the citizenry than of its
expectations of democratic perfectionism (Alvarez, 2000).
The difficulty with this response is that, despite the
many failings of democratic sovereign states, and
however imperfect their democratic systems, the fact
remains that democratic legitimacy – of the kind
obtained only at the ballot box – does matter. It is
simply a fact of contemporary life. Modern nation-state
constitutionalism is right about that – a legitimate state
is one which is democratic, respects basic human rights
and the rule of law, and looks after the common good.
In that the ballot box is indispensable. This is true both
in fact and as a matter of perception; in the contemporary world, states which seek legitimacy without
elections have serious difficulties in reality as well as
perception (Annan, 1999b).
This reply, that the ballot box is indispensable,
anticipates the second response. It is that, even granted

that democratic legitimacy is a requirement of
legitimacy in the world today, for nation states as well
as for an international system, it is not the case that
democratic legitimacy requires the actual ballot box
(Held, 1991). There are methods of participation other
than elections that can supply democratic legitimacy –
after all, representative democracy is itself a
modification of the ‘purest’ form of democracy, so why
not others? These others include participation through
intermediaries, such as NGOs and other ‘organic’ sites
of people’s actual lives, rather than through the
formality of universal suffrage. And so, for example, we
have suggestions for a new upper chamber of the UN
General Assembly, to be filled by representatives of
NGOs, and many other proposals which would deal with
the fact that even representative, quasi-parliamentary
democracy at the level of the whole planet is not
realistic (Held et al., 1999).
The effect of these other mechanisms for achieving
democratic legitimacy is, notably, to restore international NGOs to precisely the position of intermediation and representation that we earlier denied
them on the grounds that they are not a replacement
for the ballot box. And we remain as unenthusiastic as
before. This form of global civil society, and this ballotfree representation and intermediation, is not civil
society as we have so far understood it. It is not
democracy as we have understood it because, however
imperfect its implementation, it does include the
mystery of the ballot box. And it is, moreover, morally
wrong to the extent that it indulges in a sleight of hand
over what the world generally understands democracy
to mean, which does include the ballot box.
The third response acknowledges the force of this
reply, and accepts that democracy means ballot boxes,
parliamentary elections, and the associated apparatus.
These are necessities that cannot be wished away by
means of new social movements, intermediation
through NGOs or labour unions or peasant assemblies
or UN conferences or anything else. Therefore, let us
straightforwardly create a world parliamentary system;
the role of international NGOs is merely to advocate for
that system, and it is mistaken to accuse NGOs of having
a role other than temporary midwife to a democratic
system. Let us have elections and make planetary
democracy a reality (Commission on Global Governance,
1995).
This response is admirable in confronting the issue
directly, without any sleight of hand whatsoever.
Unfortunately, it confronts a profoundly practical
problem, which is that it is unlikely that planetary
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parliamentary democracy is possible. Democracy is a
system of government which rapidly bumps up against
human problems of space and numbers. It is not, in our
understanding, infinitely upwardly scalable, and
certainly not scalable up to the level of the whole planet
(Diamond, 1999).
On the contrary, what we refer to as the world’s large
democracies, with their tens of millions or hundreds of
millions of people, are really compromises between the
requirements of democracy, which tends towards the
smaller, and the wealth of the common market, which,
being a network, does benefit from growing larger and
larger. Democracy and the common market are
frequently confused, particularly by economists of a
conservative persuasion, but it is important to
understand that, although the large, wealthy
democracies have compromised their democracies
significantly in a shifting trade-off between democracy
and wealth, size and numbers take a severe toll upon
the purity of democracy. The large democratic states are
helped in various instances by common languages,
common cultures, common ethnicities, common
religions, none of which is present at the level of the
whole planet (Harrison, 2000). It is simply not the case
that parliamentary democracy can be projected and
scaled upwards from the nation state to the whole
planet.
The same problem afflicts the closely related claim
that the international system already has democratic
legitimacy, through the legitimacy of the nation states
that make it up (which ignores the question of how
many of those states are democratic); nation states pass
their legitimacy upwards to endow the international
system with legitimacy. No doubt for many purposes –
the setting of international postal rates, for example –
such legitimacy is sufficient (Slaughter, 2004). But, as
the international system both tasks itself with more and
more intrusive tasks and, it must be said, is assigned
more and more intrusive tasks by leading states,
including the United States, the ever more diluted
legitimacy that passes upwards from nation-state to
international system is inevitably far too attenuated to
satisfy the requirements of those new tasks.
The fourth response likewise confronts the issue
head-on. It says that democratic legitimacy is not really
the issue; the international system, through the tutelage
of global civil society, has another, different, moral basis
and legitimacy. It is the moral foundation of human
rights. Democracy is a lovely thing, if you can have it,
but although it is sometimes thought of as the moral
exercise of ordered liberty, really it is just a way, in the

language of economics, of sorting mass preferences, a
sort of market in politics, nothing more. It is not a
fundamental moral principle. Human rights, on the
other hand, is about fundamental moral principle. And
what global civil society brings to the international
system, infuses it with and advocates for, is human
rights. It, rather than democracy, is what gives moral
and political legitimacy.
This response puts squarely on the table what is often
an occult move by human rights advocates. Noting
correctly that somewhere, higher or lower, in the canon
of human rights one can find many references to the
value of democracy, they claim that they, too, favour
democracy. Yet in fact it would be more accurate to say
that, seeing the insuperable difficulties in creating a
genuinely democratic international system, they opt for
substituting the ideology of human rights for the
ideology of democracy (Casey and Rivkin, 2001). But this
substitution likewise fails the test of civil society in a
liberal, democratic, constitutional order, consisting of
democracy, human rights and individual guarantees, the
rule of law, and the common good. It dispenses with one
but says that it does not ultimately matter so long as
the other is available. But it does matter.
Moreover, the top-down nature of human rights
norms, and the fact that they are held, formed,
fomented and determined by what might appear, for
example, in a UN conference on women or the
environment or race to be a vast agglomeration of
groups and people, is in fact a tiny collection of
transnational activists responding to the sometimes
downright peculiar cultural characteristics of these
groups. Like other religionists, they imagine that they
carry forth moral universals that they have somehow
discerned. As they fly effortlessly from place to place,
continent to continent, capital to capital, they cannot
imagine that they are less than a universal class, pure
and disinterested, beyond geography and the
parochialism of place. They cannot grasp that ‘international’ is not the same as ‘universal’, and that even
those who have apparently abandoned fidelity to
location might still have interests, class interests to
defend, the interests of – well, the interests of those
who live in the jet stream. Nor can they grasp that there
are those at the bottom who, without being moral
relativists, nonetheless believe that they are just as
capable of discerning the true universals, just as capable
of identifying universal values, as those who take the
overnight flight business class from New York to Geneva.
The fifth and final response is an intensely practical
one. Is not the effect of this corrosive scepticism merely
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Should NGOs ‘pack up and go home’?
a call for the NGOs to pack up their tents and go home?
Of what possible value could that be? If the
fundamental complaint is that the international system
is undemocratic, how would it help if the NGOs were to
leave the scene, especially since our claim is that the
international system not merely is undemocratic but can
never become democratic? The question is an important
one because it highlights what we do not ask international NGOs to do, that is, to pack up and go home –
far from it. The original claim of international NGOs was
that they merited being respectfully heard by those
engaged in international planning and execution of
policy as well as receiving a share of the budget because
of their expertise and their competence. That is what
should indeed command respect.
But the claim to constitute ‘global civil society’
asserts a sharply different claim and role – that of
intermediary and representative of the world’s people.
This is a claim for a legitimate place that at once elevates
the role of NGOs and, significantly, dispenses with the
need for NGOs to prove their expertise and competence,
whether in development, humanitarian relief, health, or
whatever. After all, if they represent someone, especially
a ‘someone’ who is so vague as to be entirely malleable,
then what matters is their representation, not their
competence at any actual skill. This is a seductive

position for any NGO because it places it permanently
beyond the bounds of serious accountability. But it is
also a recipe for failing to serve those who most need
the help of international NGOs. Our call, therefore, is
not for international NGOs to retire from the field, but
instead to assert themselves on the basis of their
expertise and competence and, concomitantly, to give
up their claims to intermediation and representation –
that is, to give up the claim to constitute global civil
society.

A 1990s discourse in a post-9/11
world?
And yet there is a whiff of tiredness about this whole
discussion – both the claims and our responses. It all
feels very much like a discussion from the late 1990s
rather than 2004, a discussion from pre-September 11.
The question is what remains of this kind of discourse
in a world in which security is back on the table, and
with it the value of sovereignty. The love affair between
global civil society and international organisations, each
legitimising the other, during the 1990s, has given way
to an international system under a specific challenge
from the world’s superpower: make yourself relevant or
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see yourself disappear. Time was when the UN Secretary
General could go and address the Millennium Forum of
NGOs in 2000 and describe in ecstatic terms how they
represented the world’s peoples (Annan, 2000). Today,
Annan has, and must have, his eye on the White House
and a handful of other capitals; and NGOs, whether
styling themselves as global civil society or anything
else, appear frankly irrelevant as the grown-ups, nation
states, confer among themselves, sometimes with
international organisations and sometimes not.
In some respects, therefore, the ideal of a love affair,
the mutual legitimisation, between the nascent organs
of global governance and their loyal, if sometimes
critical, constituency, global civil society, appears to have
led the NGOs astray. There is a marriage, loveless and
probably childless, to be sure – and, moreover, one that
is in serious danger of ending in divorce. But it is not
between international institutions and the NGOs: it is
between the leading nation states, particularly the
superpower, and the UN. The love affair between
international organisations and global civil society was
never more than a minor affair with a minor mistress;
when push came to shove, as it did on September 11
and again in the war in Iraq, what mattered was the
marriage (including the potential divorce), not the affair.
The NGOs promised that they would, on behalf of the
people of the world, confer legitimacy on the nascent
organisations of global governance. It has turned out
that what matters to the Secretary General, when the
stakes are genuinely high, is the legitimacy that comes
from the capitals of important nation states. The
legitimacy of the ‘world’s peoples’, at least as conveyed
by global civil society, is merely icing on that cake,
dispensable as and when necessary. If that is the case,

then perhaps it is the strongest, least theoretical reason
of all why the international NGOs should give up their
claims to constitute global civil society, give up their
dreams of representing the people of the world – indeed,
devote fewer of their resources to advocacy and to
creating a system of global governance and more time
and care to the actual needs of their actual constituencies, and re-establish their claims of expertise and
competence.
That is our advice. Nevertheless, the complications
and convulsions of the world in circumstances of terror,
the war on terror, September 11 and March 11, and the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan all raise questions about
the proper roles of international NGOs even if they give
up the pretence of representativeness and intermediation. For example, the bombings of the UN and
the international Red Cross headquarters in Iraq, and
the kidnap and murder of NGO representatives as a
strategy of asymmetric fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan,
raise questions about the role international NGOs can
hope to play in the world’s most difficult circumstances
(Anderson, 2004). Of course, at one level this is the
wrong question; the whole world is not at war, and while
international NGOs that operate in dangerous zones are
the most visible in the media, the overwhelming
majority of international NGOs work in quite different
circumstances; their personnel are not being kidnapped
nor are their headquarters being blown up. It would be
a mistake to generalise on the basis of the visible
minority of NGOs that work in conflict situations.
Nevertheless, even with that caveat, it is also true
that, even where conflicts are not occurring, international NGO work has become much more difficult and
significantly more dangerous. The problem is compounded by a confusion indulged in by both the United
Nations and its agencies on the one hand and by many
international NGOs on the other. This is the fiction of
neutrality in the work of international and NGOs. There
are moments of crisis and disaster in which basic human
needs take precedence over other considerations,
moments of humanitarian emergency in which,
arguably, humanitarian aid can be thought to be
genuinely neutral, in the sense that it responds only to
need. The organisations, including NGOs, that work in
such circumstances have traditionally benefited from a
doctrine of humanitarian inviolability based on the
belief that no one could oppose activities aimed at
relieving dire human suffering. That doctrine of
humanitarian inviolability is in crisis and under attack
today from fighters who have discovered in Western aid
workers an easy means of leverage, another form of
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asymmetric warfare (Anderson, 2003). But it is also in
crisis because the aid agencies themselves have sought
to extend the concept of humanitarian inviolability to
cover a series of NGO and international agency activities
which cannot properly be regarded as neutral.
Nation building is not a politically neutral activity.
On the contrary, it is an activity which requires the
assistance of many outside agencies, whether governmental or non-governmental, if it is to work at all (itself
an open question), whose interventions, however tactful,
cannot be considered neutral (Rieff, 2002). The
commitment to democracy is not neutral; there are
many in the world who are opposed to it. The
commitment to basic human rights, including the rights
of women, is not neutral; it is the object of intense
opposition, and not merely from the Taleban and Saudi
Arabia. The list of matters which are essential to
remaking a political society and yet on which outside
aid agencies, including NGOs, cannot remain purely
neutral (in the sense of viewing any outcome as morally
and politically acceptable) is very long. It follows that
the claim of humanitarian inviolability for the activities
of agencies involved in nation building is unsound. Such
agencies have a claim to inviolability; however, it is not
based on the humanitarian nature of their work but
rather on the democratic rule of law. The confusion of
these two kinds of activity, and the respective bases on
which they operate, is potentially a fertile source of
tragedy in many sites of nation building today – not just
in Iraq or Afghanistan, but also in Kosovo, East Timor,
and other places. The confusion places genuinely neutral
humanitarian relief in a situation of dire risk, and
suggests, incorrectly, that nation building is a valueneutral enterprise.
The circumstances of the post-September 11 world
have altered the relationship between global civil society
and public international organisations such as the UN.
They have altered the relationship of mutual
legitimisation in which global civil society organisations
provided legitimacy to public international organisations
that substituted for the democratic legitimacy that one
might otherwise have thought was required. For their
part, public international organisations gave to
international NGOs an unprecedented legitimacy based
not on competence or expertise but on the presumption
of representativeness. That cosy embrace of mutual
legitimisation is no longer at the heart of international
organisations, which today look directly to the most
powerful nation states.
This means, however, that international NGOs must
also redefine their relationships and their conception of

Food aid target: humanitarian work has
become much more dangerous
their legitimacy. For many, it means, too, defining the
relationship between them and the superpower, the
United States. Global civil society (in the progressive,
left-wing, normative sense that advocates of the
concept ordinarily mean) faces something of an identity
crisis not only with respect to the US but necessarily as
well with respect to its self-conception. Actions of the
US, whether one agrees with them or not, have taken
centre stage in the world in a way not true for a long
time; and particularly at a moment in which
international NGOs cannot simply seek their identity in
an idealised relationship with international global
governance, they must determine where they stand in
relation to the United States. Plainly, there is a way in
which a belief in a certain form of liberal
internationalism as the only acceptable form of global
governance leads, at the present moment, to principled
opposition to a Bush administration committed to a
quite different concept of democratic sovereignty as the
basis of such limited global governance as it does accept.
Equally plainly, much of the global civil society
movement has simply defined global civil society to be
anti-Americanism, a sort of counter-cultural ideology
based on mere opposition, intellectually sterile where
not outright self-contradictory, and morally
uninteresting; if the intellectuals of the global civil
society movement wish to guarantee its irrelevance to
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future political debates, this is surely the way to do it,
but the loss to the discourse of the morality of
globalisation and its future directions would be
immense.
This is partly what the debate over the reconstruction
in Iraq is about for international NGOs. The United States
government has had mixed views – on this as on many
things – about the role of NGOs in occupied Iraq.
Drawing on a sort of ‘compassionate conservativism’
rhetoric grounded in certain self-help and limited
government ideologies within the United States and its
unquestionably robust civil society, the Bush administration believed that international NGOs could take a
lead in reconstruction. But such a lead was in fact far
beyond the capacities of the NGOs. Irrespective of what
one thinks of Haliburton or Bechtel, it was always some
international corporation that would have to rebuild
the oil facilities, for example, obviously not an NGO; and
the question was simply, would it be American, British
Russian or French? In part, of course, underestimating
what kind of rebuilding would be required and what
kind of opposition would be faced, but also
underestimating the visceral hatred of many of the
international NGOs for the US, the Bush administration
assumed that international NGOs would be – well, what?
partners? grantees? contractors? – present, at least, in
occupied Iraq. Global civil society, with its set of
ideological blinkers, has never really understood that,
for reasons grounded in a very American ideology, a
sizeable part of the Bush administration has always been
receptive and, indeed, overly receptive, to the work of
NGOs.
The reasons for the non-presence of the international
NGOs in Iraq are overdetermined. On the one hand, the
levels of violence and risk certainly deterred many
organisations. But on the other hand, attitudes ranging
from the refusal to be ‘tainted’, as it were, by the
occupation to a straightforward desire that the
occupation break down altogether despite the obvious
disaster that would be for the Iraqis have also been a
decisive reason for the absence of the usual collection
of international NGOs from Iraq (Anderson, 2004). At
the same time, another part of the Bush administration,
taking careful note of the aftermath of the bombings
of the UN and Red Cross headquarters in 2003, and the
subsequent mass exodus of organisations, has
questioned whether the NGOs and UN agencies really
mattered very much in the actual reconstruction efforts,
as opposed to providing icing on the cake of a legitimacy
that mattered more to outsiders than to ordinary Iraqis.
It was not so clear that the exit of the aid agencies

mattered very much to concrete material facts of
reconstruction – electricity, security, and so on. The
convulsions at the time of writing (May 2004), with
sharply increased levels of fighting in Iraq, hostage
taking and executions of Western NGO workers, and the
scandals of the prison abuses leave it unclear whether
it is true that international legitimacy of the kind
offered by UN and NGO agencies, even if it did not
contribute directly to material conditions such as
electricity and potable water, would have contained the
present violence. It is not possible to know how things
will turn out as of this moment, and we will not
speculate further about current events.
What is clear, however, is that the coin that many
NGOs, like the UN agencies, offer is now not necessarily
their competence or expertise. What they offer is
legitimacy and cover – a sort of branding process
whereby money from various national sources,
particularly from the US, is ‘re-branded’ with the logos
of some NGO, or UN agency, or both. Legitimacy is not
to be sneered at, to be sure; it is an invaluable, if
intangible, element of political stability, in Iraq as
elsewhere. But the entitlement of international NGOs
to offer legitimacy, and to receive legitimacy, that is
among the ideologically extravagant claims of global
civil society is suspect. Nor is it merely an academic
question, a question of the success or failure of this or
that intellectual analogy. The stakes are much, much
higher. Organisations that have legitimacy based on
representativeness have less necessity, frankly, to be
either expert or competent. It is a recipe for rot and
utter lack of accountability.
Unmoved by the claims of representativeness, and
disbelieving that the assent of NGOs to this or that is a
substitute for ballot-box democracy, we believe that the
value and the salvation of the international NGO
movement lie in giving up the pretensions, however
seductive, of the ideology of global civil society and
making its case to be heard on the basis of undeniable
expertise and competence.
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